The decreasing engagement and effectiveness of bug bounty programs signal a shift in cybersecurity vulnerability disclosure. (Illustrative AI-generated image).
- Bug bounty programs at Nextcloud and cURL are ending because they are overwhelmed by low-quality and AI-generated vulnerability reports.
- The ease of using AI and automated tools has drastically lowered the barrier to entry for submitting reports, leading to a flood of noise that buries genuine findings.
- Maintainers are spending excessive time triaging useless submissions, making the cost of running bug bounty programs outweigh the benefits.
- The trend suggests a potential breakdown of the traditional bug bounty model, forcing a re-evaluation of how security vulnerabilities are disclosed and rewarded.
- Future solutions may involve reputation systems, paid triage services, vulnerability research grants, or more selective disclosure processes.
- While bug bounties are not entirely dead, they are evolving, and the era of every report being considered special is over.
Imagine you run a popular open-source project. You set up a bug bounty program to encourage security researchers to find flaws in your code. You offer money for real vulnerabilities. But instead of careful reports, your inbox fills up with automated scan dumps, copied-and-pasted output from free tools, and now, entire paragraphs written by AI that sound convincing but find nothing real. That is exactly what happened to Nextcloud and cURL. Both projects recently announced they are ending their bug bounty programs. The reason: too many low-quality reports that waste time and money.
This is not an isolated event. It points to a bigger change in cybersecurity. Security researcher Filippo Valsorda captured the feeling in his recent essay titled “Vulnerability reports are not special anymore.” The essay argues that the flood of automated and AI-generated submissions has made each individual report less valuable. When anyone can produce a report in seconds, the signal gets buried in noise. The question now is: what happens when vulnerability reports lose their special status?
The Quiet Death of Bug Bounty Programs
Bug bounty programs have been a key part of internet security for over a decade. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Facebook pay researchers for finding bugs. Smaller projects also run them, often through platforms like HackerOne or Bugcrowd. The idea is simple: offer a reward, and people will find problems before criminals do. It worked well for years. But recently, the model has started to crack.
Two high-profile closures show the trend. Nextcloud, a popular file-sharing platform, ended its bug bounty program because of too many low-quality reports. According to Techzine Global, the program was overwhelmed with submissions that were not useful. Many were from automated scanners that produce noisy output with no real impact. The cost of triaging these reports became higher than the value of finding actual bugs.
Then there is cURL, a fundamental tool used by billions of devices to transfer data. The cURL project announced it is shutting down its bug bounty program specifically due to “AI slop reports.” The term “AI slop” refers to low-quality content generated by large language models. These reports look like real vulnerability descriptions but often contain hallucinations or irrelevant details. Neowin reported that the maintainers could no longer handle the flood. They decided it was better to stop the program than to waste time filtering garbage.
These are not just two random projects. Both Nextcloud and cURL are respected, widely used open-source projects. If they cannot make bug bounties work, who can?
What ‘Vulnerability Reports Are Not Special’ Really Means
Filippo Valsorda is a well-known cryptography engineer and open-source maintainer. His essay struck a nerve. The Hacker News discussion of his article got 228 points and 122 comments in a short time. That means many people in the security community feel the same way.
The phrase “not special anymore” captures a shift in perception. A vulnerability report used to be a rare thing. It required skill, time, and effort to find a bug and write a clear description. The reporter had to understand the code, craft a proof of concept, and explain the impact. That work was respected and rewarded. Now, with automated scanners and AI writing assistants, anyone can generate a report in minutes. The barrier to entry has dropped to zero.
But the problem is not just quantity. It is quality. Real vulnerabilities still exist, but they are drowned out by noise. Maintainers have to spend hours reading each report to decide if it is real. Some reports are so poorly written that they are impossible to understand. Others describe a bug that does not exist. Some are clearly copied from other reports or generated by AI without any actual testing.
Valsorda’s argument is that the signal-to-noise ratio has become so bad that the entire model of open submissions is breaking down. When anyone can submit a report, and many do, the system becomes a burden rather than a help.
The AI Slop Problem: Quantity Over Quality
The rise of generative AI has made the situation worse. Tools like ChatGPT and GitHub Copilot can write convincing vulnerability reports even when there is no vulnerability. They can describe a SQL injection in vague terms, reference common attack patterns, and sound authoritative. But the report may be entirely fabricated. The AI may have hallucinated a library or a function that does not exist. Or it may describe a general weakness that does not apply to the specific project.
Some researchers are using AI to speed up their work. That is fine if they verify the findings. But many submit AI-generated reports without checking. They are hoping for a quick payout. This is sometimes called “AI slop” – low-effort content created to game the system.
The economic incentive is clear. Bug bounties pay real money, sometimes thousands of dollars for a critical vulnerability. Even a small payout of $100 is worth it if you can submit 100 AI-generated reports in an hour. The chances that one might be accepted are low, but the cost of generating them is nearly zero. So the flood continues.
What kinds of low-quality reports are we talking about? Some are simple automated scan outputs. Tools like Nessus or OpenVAS generate long lists of potential issues. Many are false positives. Submitting the entire scan output as a bug report is lazy but common. Others are partial manual tests that lack proof. And now, AI-written reports that describe a bug in a generic way, without actual exploitation steps.
For maintainers, each report must be triaged. Triage means reading, reproducing if possible, and deciding if it is a real issue. For a small open-source project with one or two maintainers, this can take hours per week. Over time, the burden grows. Some projects have stopped accepting reports outside of their issue tracker. Others have closed their bug bounties entirely.
How Nextcloud and cURL Made the Hard Call
Nextcloud is a file sync and share platform used by individuals and businesses. It has a strong focus on security. Its bug bounty program was run through a third-party platform. But the volume of low-quality reports became unmanageable. According to the Techzine Global report, the decision to end the program was not easy. Nextcloud still wants to receive vulnerability reports, but through a controlled process. They now ask researchers to contact the security team directly or use a mailing list. That way, they can filter out noise before it reaches the maintainers.
cURL is a command-line tool and library for data transfer. It is everywhere – in almost every operating system, embedded devices, and mobile apps. Its security is critical. The cURL project had a bug bounty program for years. But the influx of AI-generated reports forced a change. The Neowin article says the maintainers were spending too much time on reports that had no real value. They decided to shut the program down rather than continue the downward spiral.
Both projects made the same calculation: the cost of running the bounty program was no longer worth the benefit. The programs were attracting more noise than genuine bugs. And the noise was not just annoying – it was actively harmful because it distracted from real issues and burned out volunteers.
It is important to note that neither project is giving up on security. They will still accept vulnerability reports through other channels. They just stopped offering money for them. That is a big shift.
The Community Reacts: Hacker News and Researcher Sentiment
The Hacker News discussion around Valsorda’s article shows a divided community. Some agree that bug bounty programs are becoming unsustainable. They point to the same experiences with their own projects. Others worry that ending programs will reduce incentives for researchers. Without bounties, why would anyone bother reporting a bug? They could sell it on the black market or keep it for themselves.
Many commenters share stories of being overwhelmed by low-quality reports. One maintainer said they received 20 reports per month, only one of which was a real vulnerability. Another said that AI-generated reports often sound plausible at first but fall apart under scrutiny. Several people suggested that platforms like HackerOne and Bugcrowd should do more to filter submissions. But those platforms are also struggling. They have financial incentives to keep the volume high because they get a cut of bounties. So the problem may not be solved by middlemen.
Researchers themselves are split. Some view bug bounties as a legitimate way to earn income. They put in real work and deserve payment. They are frustrated that low-quality reports devalue their efforts. Others see the system as broken and think it is time for a new approach. A few suggest that vulnerability research grants could replace bounties. Instead of paying per bug, companies could fund researchers to do deep work on a project for a fixed period. That would reward quality over quantity.
The emotional tone of the discussion is one of resignation. Many feel that the golden age of bug bounties is over. The flood of AI slop may be the final straw.
Is There a Path Forward? Reputation Systems, Paid Triage, or Something Else?
If bug bounty programs are in trouble, what comes next? There is no single answer, but several ideas are being discussed.
One idea is reputation systems. Platforms could track the quality of a researcher’s past reports. Only those with a proven track record could submit freely. Newcomers would need to earn trust. This already happens to some extent on platforms like HackerOne, where the top researchers have high reputations. But it is not enough to stop the flood. Many low-quality reports come from accounts with no history. They submit once and never come back. Reputation systems cannot stop that unless new accounts are severely restricted.
Another idea is paid triage. Projects could hire a dedicated person to filter reports before they reach the maintainers. This is expensive but could be shared across multiple projects. Some bug bounty platforms already offer managed triage as a service. But that only shifts the cost. The project still pays, and the cost may be higher than the value of the bugs found.
Some suggest that projects should stop using bug bounty platforms altogether and return to private disclosure processes. That means only accepting reports from a trusted group of researchers via email or a private bug tracker. This reduces noise but also reduces the chance of finding new bugs from the wider community.
Vulnerability research grants are another option. Instead of a pay-per-bug model, a company can fund a researcher to spend a month looking for vulnerabilities in a specific project. The researcher gets paid regardless of how many bugs they find. This encourages thorough work and reduces the incentive to submit low-quality reports. However, it requires more trust and coordination. It also does not scale to the entire community. Only a few researchers can get grants at a time.
There is also talk of using AI to fight AI. Some tools are being developed to detect AI-written reports. But it is a cat-and-mouse game. As detectors improve, so will the generators.
Ultimately, the path forward may be a mix of approaches. Projects may need to be more selective about who can submit reports. They may need to invest more in triage or rely on a smaller group of trusted researchers. The open call for everyone to submit anything may no longer be viable.
What This Means for the Future of Security Disclosure
The closures at Nextcloud and cURL are warning signs. They show that the traditional model of bug bounties is under serious strain. The problem is not going away. As AI tools get better, the volume of low-quality reports will likely increase. The signal will only get harder to find.
For small open-source projects that rely on community reports, this is especially worrying. They cannot afford to pay for triage. They cannot stop all spam. They depend on good-faith researchers to help them find bugs. But if the good reports are buried in junk, the project may become less secure over time. That is a real risk.
Big companies like Google and Microsoft still run large bug bounty programs. They have resources to filter reports. But even they are not immune. They have seen an increase in low-quality submissions. They have started adding requirements like minimum report quality or only paying for certain types of bugs.
The security community is at a turning point. The democratization of vulnerability reporting has been a double-edged sword. It brought more eyes to code, but it also brought more noise. Now, the noise is threatening to drown out the signal. Filippo Valsorda’s essay captured that moment. It is a call to rethink how we handle vulnerabilities.
Bug bounties are not dead. But they are changing. The days when any report was special are over. From now on, projects will have to work harder to separate the wheat from the chaff. And researchers who produce real, high-quality work will need to find new ways to stand out. The system is evolving. Whether it evolves into something better or something worse depends on decisions made now.
One thing is clear: we cannot go back to the old way. The flood of AI slop has made sure of that.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why are Nextcloud and cURL shutting down their bug bounty programs?
Both Nextcloud and cURL are ending their bug bounty programs because they are inundated with a high volume of low-quality and AI-generated vulnerability reports. These submissions waste the maintainers' time and resources, making the programs unsustainable.
What is meant by 'AI slop' in vulnerability reports?
'AI slop' refers to low-quality content generated by AI tools like ChatGPT. These reports often sound convincing but may contain fabricated details, hallucinations, or describe general weaknesses that don't apply to the specific project, without any actual testing.
Has the value of vulnerability reports decreased?
Yes, according to security researcher Filippo Valsorda, vulnerability reports are 'not special anymore.' The ease of generating reports with AI and automated tools means the signal of genuine bugs is often lost in the noise of low-quality submissions.
Are bug bounty programs completely dead?
No, bug bounty programs are not completely dead, but they are undergoing significant changes. The traditional model of an open call for any report is becoming unsustainable for many projects, leading to a need for new approaches.
What are some potential alternatives to traditional bug bounty programs?
Potential alternatives include implementing reputation systems for researchers, hiring paid triage teams to filter reports, returning to private disclosure processes, or offering vulnerability research grants for focused work on specific projects.
Will big companies like Google and Microsoft also shut down their bug bounty programs?
While big companies also face an increase in low-quality submissions, they generally have more resources to filter reports. However, even they are adapting by implementing stricter requirements for report quality and payment eligibility.
What does this mean for security disclosure in the future?
The trend indicates a shift towards more controlled and selective processes for security disclosure. Projects will likely need to invest more in triage or rely on trusted researchers, making it harder for low-effort or AI-generated reports to succeed.
